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2025/00243213
| Date | Party | Submission |
|---|---|---|
| 28/8/2025 | Appellant | Notice of Appeal (PDF, 3.0 MB) |
| 12/9/2025 | Appellant | Submissions (PDF, 9.2 MB) |
| 26/9/2025 | First Respondent | Submissions (PDF, 352.9 KB) |
| 24/9/2025 | Respondent | Submissions (PDF, 443.6 KB) |
| 3/10/2025 | Appellant | Reply (PDF, 5.0 MB) |
EQUITY – Newington College (the School) is an independent school – since the School’s foundation, it has operated as an all-boys school – the School, in its present form, was established under the auspices of the Methodist Church, pursuant to a Deed of Indenture dated 23 October 1873 (the 1873 Deed) – the 1873 Deed provided for the establishment of both a “Collegiate School” and a “Theological Institution” on a large block of land at Stanmore, in Sydney’s inner western suburbs – in November 2023, the Council of Newington College (the first respondent) decided to introduce coeducation and began taking the steps required to give effect to that decision – the question raised at first instance was whether that was permissible under the School’s governing statute – the appellant, Student A, is one of the pupils at the School, and the proceedings are being conducted on his behalf by an adult tutor – the principal contention made on behalf of Student A in these proceedings is that the word “youth” in the 1873 Deed refers only to boys and young men, and does not include young women and girls – it is said to follow from this that it is not open to the School to transition to coeducation, as it is planning to do, or to expend the resources of the School on that plan – at first instance, the primary judge concluded that the word “youth” in the 1873 Deed was used in a gender-neutral sense and does not mandate male-only enrolment at the College – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the word "youth" as contained in the 1873 Deed was used in a gender-neutral sense – whether the primary judge ought to have found that the word "youth" as contained in the 1873 Deed refers to boys and young men – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the "ancient documents rule" cannot apply in the absence of a finding that the 1873 Deed is ambiguous or obscure.
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